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TRADE AND PROTECTION WITH MULTI-STAGE PRODUCTION
Abstract
This paper analyzes trade in manufactured goods that are produced via
a vertical production structure with many stages, where some value is added
at each to an intermediate product to yield a good—in—process ready for
the next stage. We consider the stage at which a good is traded to be an
economically endogenous variable, with comparative advantage determining
the pattern of production specialization by stages across countries. We
study how endowment changes and policy shifts move the margin of comparative
advantage, which thus provides a channel for resource allocation adjustment
that is additional to the usual ones of factor substitution and changes in
the quantity of output.
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The importance of intermediate goods in international trade is widely
recognized, and many models have been constructed to analyze positive and
normative issues raised by such trade. The early models of effective pro-
tection, e.g. Balassa (1965), Corden (1966), Jones (1971), Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1973), assumed a vertical two—stage production structure. Pure
intermediate goods were produced using primary factors at an upstream
stage, and combined with further primary factors to yield the final goods
at the downstream stage. With both kinds of goods tradeable, the effect
of a tariff structure on resource allocation could be studied. Some recent
models use this structure for different questions. For example, Sanyal
and Jones (1980) consider the pattern and effects of trade in intermediate
goods alone, by assuming that all goods must undergo further processing in
their ultimate destination, before being consumed. Grossman (1981) examines
content protection which requires that a certain proportion of value added
be domestic. A parallel strand of literature, e.g. Vanek (1963), Melvin
(1969) and Warne (1971), investigates the implications of interindustry
flows when all industries produce final goods that may also serve as inputs
to production in other industries. The usual generalization of all of
these two—stage production structures is to a complete input—output model
where goods may be intermediate, final or both, as in Woodland (1977).
An alternative extension would better describe the reality of many
manufacturing industries. This is a vertical structure with many stages,
where some value is added at each stage to an intermediate product to yield
a "good—in—process" ready for the next stage. Different stages may have—2—
different technologies or factor intensities. Considerations of comparative
advantage determine the pattern of production specialization by stages
across countries.
The most important new feature of this view is that the stage at which
a good is traded is itself an economically endogenous variable. Endowment
changes or policy shifts can move this margin of comparative advantage,
thus providing a channel for resource allocation adjustment that is additional
to the usual ones of factor substitution (movement along an isoquant) and
changes in the quantity of output (movement between isoquants).
Thepractical importance of this kind of production specialization and
trade has risen in recent years, as transnational firms have increasingly
integrated their production on a worldwide basis. In the automobile indus-
try, the manufacture of component parts and the assembly of the product is
arranged in this way in the European market, and sometimes even more widely.
In this context, the adjustment mechanism is easily illustrated. Increased
content protection requirements will lead to more parts of each car being
produced domestically, and not to a shift in the proportions of wholly do-
mestic versus wholly imported cars. Other examples can be found in assembly
of electronic equipment, and even of shirts being shipped to the far east to
have buttons sewn on. In some cases the product, in the course of these stages,
may cross international boundaries more than once.
In this paper we study trade of this kind by modelling the production
process as a continuum of stages. Stages are distinguished byfactor inten-
sities, and comparative advantage determines the pattern of production and
trade. Our model bears some formal similarity to the models of trade with
a continuum of goods of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977, 1980) and—3--
Falvey (1981), but our concern is with the effects of factor accumulation
and protection on the allocation of resources to the entire sector repre-
sented by the continuum.-' Also, since most of the production in our
continuum yields intermediate goods, demand for this output is derived
demand.
The industry with a continuum of intermediate stages, on which we
concentrate most of our attention, is called "manufacturing" for sake of
brevity. The rest of output is aggregated into one final good which is
produced directly from primary factors and called "agriculture". We con-
sider a semi—small country, i.e. one which can affect its coinniodity terms
of trade but not the factor prices or incomes in the rest of the world.
We find that production specialization with respect to the stages
in manufacturing is complete, i.e. the country with the highest wage—rental
ratio concentrates production at the most capital—intensive end of the
spectrum of stages. However, as in the simple sector—specific capital
model, comparative advantage is not governed by factor endowment consider-
ations alone. Turning to effects of policies, we find that increased pro-
tection by either tariff or content requirement is successful in the very
limited sense of expanding the range of processes undertaken domestically.
But it runs a very real risk of failing by decreasing the quantity of
output of the manufactured good by so much that resources are shifted
away from this sector. This extends the earlier results for content pro-
tection of Grossman (1981) to adjustment at the margin of production stages,
and is consistent with the intuition developed in the effective protection
literature, that tariff schedules which incorporate duties on intermediate
goods may be anti—protective for a sector as a whole. Finally, as in more
familiar models, a small tariff, by improving the final good terms of trade,
must raise social welfare provided non—distorting policies are available to
redistribute income.—4—
II. THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
The stages of manufacturing are indexed by i, ranging over the interval
[0, 11 .Theupstream end of the range is i0, and the downstream end is
i =1 .Weassume that all goods with index i <1are pure intermediates,
i.e. consumers demand only output that has completed the entire continuum
of stages. The intermediate good at stage i + di is produced from one unit
of stage i output, and a capital—labor mix of cost f(w, r, i)di, where w is
the wage rate and r the rental rate on capital. Thus the inputs of the
good in process from an earlier stage are naturally in fixed proportions,
but capital and labor can be substituted for each other in adding value.
The function f has the usual properties of a unit cost function with respect
to w and r; in particular the optimum labor—capital ratio is
We do not consider any time to be required in this production process.
For the final good to emerge, all that is then required is that it should
pass once through each stage, and the ordering of the stagesis immaterial.
We will find it convenient to choose the order by increasing labor intensity,
so that
(f If)/Bi>0 (1) w r
Now consider two countries with factor prices (w1, r1) and (w2, r2)
which have equal costs in operating the stage of production from i to i + di,
i.e.
f(w1, r1, j*) =f(w2,r2, i*)
(2)—5—
Choose the numbering so that w1 >w2
the two countries have a common unit
cost contour map twists clockwise as
and r1 <r2
.Asshown in Figure 1,
cost contour at i .By(1), the
i increases.
f(w1, r1, i) >f(w2,r2, 1) for (3)
Therefore comparative advantage for stages downstream from i* lies with
country 2, and upstream from i with 1. In other words, the high—wage
country will specialize in carrying out the stages at the capital—intensive
end of the range, and the low—wage country at the labor—intensive end.
The marginal point of indifference 1* given by (2) is of course endogenous
to the full model, and it moves as endowments, tariffs etc. change factor
prices in one or both countries.









Then, for i >i,country 1 must be on a higher cost contour than 2, i.e.—6—
The upshot is that country 1 produces all the stages up to 1*, and
exports the good at this stage to country 2, which completes the rest of
the stages to the downstream end. Our choice of ordering precludes any
reversals or multiple switches of comparative advantage. Since we are
neglecting transport costs, this is a harmless simplification.
The unit cost of production, and therefore the price, of the final
good can be found by summing the incremental unit costs over all stages,









We now embed this model of manufacturing into a complete model of trade.
The manufacturing sector and its output is denoted by x .Theagricultural
sector and its output is y; this good is chosen as the numeraire, and the
relative price of the x—good is p .Agricultureuses inputs of labor Ly
and land T; manufacturing uses labor L and capital K .Totallabor L is
mobile between the sectors, but land and capital are specific to their
sectors.
We concentrate on a semi—small country with wage w and capital rental r.
We assume that the factor—endowment ratios in the home country are sufficiently
different from those in the rest of the world to prevent factor—price equal-
ization. This is the only interesting case for comparative statics, since the
specialization of stages obtained in Section 2 collapses to total indifference
when factor prices are equa1.-' For sake of brevity we confine ourselves to
the case where w/r is less than that in the rest of the world. So this country—7—
produces all stages downstream from the marginal index i. The value added




We treat the rest of the world as one country, and denote variables
pertaining to it by means of a bar overhead. The factor prices w, r are
independent of the home country's behavior, and can be suppressed where not





Weabbreviate f(w, r, i) as f(i)
Let z denote the rental of land, and g(w, z) the unit cost function
in agriculture. We assume that the home country produces something in
both sectors.--' Then the price—cost equations are
g(w, z) =1 (7)
(i*) + F(w, r, i*) =p (8)
The price partial derivatives of the unit cost functions give the
optimum factor inputs per unit output. Therefore the factor—market clearing
conditions are
w' z) =T (9)—8—
x Fr(W r, j*) =K (10)
gW' z) + x F(w, r, j*) =L (11)
Next we have the condition governing the marginal stage of manufacturing
production
=f(w,r, i*) (12)




Let its demand for the final output of the manufactured good be D(p,Q)
Let the rest of the world's demand by (p); any othervariables affecting
D are outside the control of the semi—small home countryand can be omitted.
Then we have
D(p, Q) + (p) =x (14)
In (7) —(14)we have eight equations to determine the factor prices
w, z and r, the output relative price p,the output quantities x and y,
national income Q, and most importantly, the marginal stage1*—9—
IV.CONPARATIVESTATICS: FACTOR ACCUMULATION
The above equilibrium will be shifted by exogenous changes in K, T and
L .Inthis section we study the effects of factor accumulation on the
patterns of production and trade. Here we assume that free trade prevails;
analysis of commercial policy will be taken up in the next section.
The comparative static effects of changes in factor endowments are
derived by total differentiation of (7) —(14).After some substitution,
we derive a matrix equation in terms of changes in three crucial variables:
w, p and 1* .Leta carat over a variable indicate a proportional change,
e.g. w Edw/w.Thenwe find
+ XLyy XL/v _XLX(K -aLw
—1 aK/v
0Lxx + 0Lxx/ di*j
ALx ALy -l
0 0 0 T (15)
1 —Q°K YnQeT YnQeL £
Thesymbols are defined as follows. The fraction of the laborforce
allocated to sector n, for n =x,y, is denoted by AL .Thedistributive
share of factor ni, for m =K,T, L, in a relevant sector n is O, while— 10—
*
that in national income is 0 .Form =K,L, we set cx 0 /0 ,where
m mmx mx
*
is the distributive share of factor m in the marginal manufacturing
stage 1*, e.g. w f(w, r, i*)/f(w, r, 1*) .Theelasticity of fac-
tor substitution in agriculture is a .Thatin manufacturing, in the
aggregate sense holding i constant, is a ,i.e.a F F IF F.The
elasticity of demand for labor in sector : is , andequals aI(l OL)
The rate at which relative costs of manufacturing stages change between
the countries as the indexrises from the marginal value i is denoted by
71, i.e. 71 E [f1(i*) —f.(w,r, j*)]/f(w, r, j*) The share of domestic
value added in a unit of manufacturing output is v, i.e. v F/p .We
define
flQ
E QDQ/D the income elasticity of home demand for manufactures,
and y E D/x, the share of home consumption in their world output. Finally,
the total price elasticity of world demand for manufactures multiplied by
minus one is written ,whichwe assume to be positive.i'
Note that aK > 1 > cxL, since the marginal stage i is the most capital
intensive of the stages undertaken domestically, and each c. is the ratio of
the marginal to average factor share. Also, cr > 0 because comparativecost
advantage shifts to the home country as i increases.
Writingfor the 3—by—3 matrix on the left hand side of (15), itis
now straightforward to show that
det EAL(71fl + +" y (n +0Lx + c )
f + XL nF(cxK —cxK)(aK
—1) (16)
>0— 11—
Thekey economic variable of interest in this model is the marginal
stage of processing, i .Thereforewe focus our comparative static
analysis on its response to factor endowment changes. Consider first the
effect of an increase in the capital stock. By application of Cramer's






aKAL + (1-p0v) (17) V xKx
where is the marginal propensity to consume manufactures at home.
The expression in (17) is unambiguously negative if the agricultural good
is not inferior, i.e. p <1.At this level of aggregation, it makes
sense to assume that both goods are normal, and we do so henceforth.
This result accords with intuition. A rise in the capital stock, by
increasing the wage—rental ratio, allows the home country to compete in
more capital—intensive activities, and thereby expands the range of pro-
cesses in which it specializes. In other words, our labor—rich country
will import intermediate goods at an earlier, more capital—intensive, stage
as it accumulates capital, regardless of whether any of the production
technologies admit factor substitution.
It is not necessarily true, though, that capital accumulation will
cause mobile resources to reallocate to the manufacturing sector, even as
the range of processes performed at home expands. Differentiating L/T =g/g
and using the definition of ,wehave L =—w + T .Thereforethe
y y y
direction of flow of labor is revealed by the response of w, which is given by— 12—
A K3w Lx) K




If n, thetotal price elasticity of world demand for manufactures, is small,
the second term in the brackets will be negative and the agricultural sector
may expand. This effect is more likely the smaller is t,thehome marginal
propensity to consume manufactures, and the larger is ,theelasticity of
factor substitution in manufacturing. The most likely outcome, however, is
for capital accumulation to cause an increase in the net imports of agricul—
8/ tural goods,— and an increase in the domestic value added per unit of man-
ufactured output.
We next consider the effects of an increase in the endowment of land.
The response of the marginal manufacturing stage to such growth is ambiguous.






where eisthe share of sector x in national product. An important case
to consider, based on empirical evidence forseveral less developed countries,
is one in which factor substitution possibilities at any given stageare
limited, but processes vary greatly in their relativeintensities of factor
usage.2' With and c small, and (cK —1)large, (18) is negative. For
these parameter values, accumulation of the specificfactor in agriculture— 13—
hasthe same effect as that in manufacturing, namely an expansion of the
range of stages produced by the low—wage home country. In fact, with




which is independent of demand conditions and depends only on the relative
sizes of the sectors and the factor intensity differences between the mar—
ginal and average processes. Alternatively, whenq is small, an increase
in the endowment of land is seen to cause the home country to specialize
in a smaller number of stages.
The intuition for these results is as follows. An increase in the
endowment of land, ceteris paribus, increases the demand for labor in agri-
culture. This pushes up the wage rate, and thus the wage—rental ratio in
manufacturing. This alone would tend to expand the range of manufacturing
processes undertaken domestically. But the additional income that accrues
to the new land is partially spent on manufactures, raising their price and
therefore the demand for capital. This effect is large whenn is small, i.e.
when world demand for manufactures is price inelastic. It in turn pushes up
the rental rate on capital. Then the equilibrium wage—rental ratio can actually
fall, and the marginal index 1* can rise. As a further point of interest, we
note that the reallocation of labor in response to an increase in the endowment









whichis more likely to be positive the larger the price elasticity of
world demand, the smaller the home marginal propensity to consume manu-
factures, and the smaller the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor in agriculture.
An increase in the labor supply also has an ambiguous effect on the




eJ(1/v—p)} (22) x x
A small elasticity of substitution between land and labor in agriculture
contributes to an expansion in the range of home processes, while a small
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in manufacturing has
the opposite effect. If both are small the marginal domestic stage is
necessarily more labor—intensive. Note that the range of home processing
is more likely to increase in response to an increase in labor endowment
the smaller the price elasticity of world demand for manufactures, the
smaller the home marginal propensity to spend on manufactures, and the
smaller the factor intensity differences across manufacturing stages. The
immediate effect of an increase in labor supply is a fall in the wage rate.
However, if the demand for capital falls greatly, as will be the caseif
the increase in national income is spent on agricultural goods and if the
price elasticity of demand for manufactures is small, anyfall in the
wage—rental ratio in manufacturing will be small. Sinceirdi* =
_OKX(czK
—l)(w—r)
+ ply, a small decrease in w/r is consistent with a decreasein 1* so long as
—1)is small, and p falls.— 15—
Tosum up, we have shown that factor endowment changes affect the
patterns of production and trade with multi—stage processing in a complex
way. There is some presumption, especially if elasticities of factor
substitution are small and the price elasticity of world demand for manu-
factures is large, that an exogenous increase in the supply of either
specific factor will cause the range of domestic manufacturing processes
to expand, whereas an increase in the supply of the mobile factor will
have the opposite effect. But since resources may be allocated to, or
withdrawn from, the manufacturing sector on either of two margins, one
intensive and one extensive, the complexities and ambiguities of general
equilibrium comparative statics are unavoidable. Effects from the demand
side can easily overturn the intuitive supply—side impacts, unlike the.
simple two—sector models.
V. COMPARATIVE STATICS: TARIFFS AND CONTENT PROTECTION
In this section we study the effects of two forms of protection. First,
we consider a uniform tariff at an ad valorem rate t on imports of all
manufactured goods, starting from an initial level of t =O'Secondly,
we investigate a content protection scheme which requires that v, the fraction
of value added domestically, be raised by a small amount starting from that
which obtains in a free—trade equilibrium. Such an increase is mandated by
the government, and is enforced by a threat of some economic sanction for
noncompliance.
When a uniform tariff schedule is in place, the equilibrium conditions
must be modified slightly. We have to replace (8) by
(j*)(l + t) + F(w, r, j*) =p (8')
and (12) by— 16—
f(j*)(l+ t) =f(w,r, j*) (12')
to include the tariff costs faced by private producers. Further, we must
include tariff revenues in national income, so (13) is replaced by
Q=xT+rK+wL+tF(i*)x (13')
Taking total differentials of the new system and evaluating at t =0we
have the comparative statics of the small tariff in the implicit form
-XLX(l
—v)/v
E -[1 + v)/v] dt (23)
di* OL(l —v)/v
Does a uniform tariff protect the manufacturing sector? The answer
depends on the desired sense of 'protection'. Consider first theeffect
on the range of processes undertaken at home, given by
=
detEXLXX' + Lyy + aK(l —v)/vl+ xLeL/v (24)
<0
Therefore a tariff is unambiguously protective in the limited sense of
expanding the range of home activity to include more capitale—intensive
stages of processing. However, perhaps a better measure of protection
for the manufacturing sector as a whole is in terms of the reallocation of
labor. By this measure a tariff runs the real risk of being anti—protective,- 17—
becauseit raises the cost of intermediates and thereby lowers the effective
protection for the downstream stages. Thus a uniform tariff fails to pro-
tect whenever the fall in manufacturing output it causes results in the
release of more labor than is required to perform the new activities at






(1 + + [(1 —v)— (25)
For small this is positive, and a tariff is necessarily anti—protective
in the resource allocation sense. It is interesting to note that whenever





F aKALyy(1 + aK
1 —
+ > (26)
a tariff may well reduce the real reward for the mobile factor in terms of
both final goods, a possibility that does not exist in the standard two—
good sector—specific—factor model.
A final question concerns the aggregate welfare effects of a small
tariff. If the home demand functions result from maximization of a
Bergson—Samuelson social welfare function, we can write the change in
social welfare as
dU/X =dQ—Ddp (27)—18—
where U is social welfare, and X is its pure income derivative. Now from (13')
dQ =Tdz+ Ldw + Kdr + F(i*)xdt
on evaluation at t= 0.Note that L =L+ L ,and(7) gives Tdz + L dw =0, x y y
while from (8) we have Ldw + Kdr =x(dp—F(i*)dt).With the aid of these,
(27) becomes
dU/A =(x—D)dp (28)
which is just the terms—of—trade effect on the final manufactures exports.
It is perhaps surprising that the expression in (28) is so simple. It is
understood by recognizing that the extra cost of inputs to domestic producers
is exactly offset by the tariff revenue that is raised, and since at free
trade the costs of undertaking the marginal stage are equalized, the distortion
created by a small tariff is a second—order effect.
We have seen in (26) that dp/dt is positive. Thus our semi—small
country benefits by using a small tariff to alter the terms of trade in its
favor. The anti—protective effect in resource allocation is only a distrib-
utive loss, not an aggregate one. Provided the government can redistribute
income optimally at home, a small tariff provides protection in the eco-
nomically relevant sense after all.
Finally, we consider an alternative form of protection that is being
increasingly used by governments. This is a content requirement for multi-
stage industries of the sort modelled in this paper. Under such a policy
regime domestic firms are required to achieve a specific percentage of— 19—
domesticvalue added in their final product. Economic penalties are imposed
for failure to comply. An important outgrowth of many content requirement
schemes has been an expansion in the range of intermediates processes in
which the domestic firms specialize, rather than an increase in the domestic
share of traded intermediates. This aspect of content protection is not
captured in previous analyses, e.g. Corden (1971) or Grossman (1981), which
are couched in terms of standard two—stage production with all goods traded
and complete non—specialization. The prominence given to specialization of
production by stages of processing in the model developed here makes it par-
ticularly appropriate for the study of content protection.
A single modification of the equilibrium conditions in Section III is
required under a content protection scheme. The costs at stage i* need no
longer be equal in the two countries; instead, the margin must adjust to
fulfill the content requirement. Thus we replace (12) by
F(w,r, j*) =vp (12")
wherevis now an exogenous policy variable. In other words, the government
dictates that the share of domestic in total value added be greaterthan
occurs in free trade, and enforces the policy by unspecified penaltiesthat
are assumed sufficient to induce compliance. The relativedomestic and
foreign unit costs at the marginal stage are now determined endogenously.
We differentiate the equilibrium conditions totally as v changes,and
evaluate the derivatives at an initial free—trade equilibrium, whereof
course the two unit costs happen to be equal. After theusual substitu-
tions, we are left with the matrix equation— 20—
TALxx+ ALyy ALxxIV ALx(K r o
0 -(1 -v)/v f/F
J[J
(29)
0Lxx (fl + @/V)
_akf/F di*Loj
Let E" be the 3—by—3 matrix on the left hand side. Then
A+(l—v)c
det E" = +
1 —
V)+ A +Lx x
> 0
FLLxx V Lyy V )
Contentprotection, like a tariff, unambiguously expands the range
of domestic manufacturing activities. The comparative static derivative
of the marginal stage is
V =detE"Lx + XLyy(fl+ eLXX/v)) (30)
But,again like a uniform tariff, and for much the same reasons, content
protection can be anti—protective for the sector as a whole.—— The di-







Thereforecontent protection will cause a moveofresources away from
manufacturing in exactly those cases which may be of empirical relevance,
namely when the elastie-ity of substitution between capital and labor in— 21—
manufacutringis small and the differences in factor intensities across





+ :kLyyak) >0 (32)
so the real return to labor is again reduced in terms of both goods in
these cases. However, the aggregate welfare again increases since the
commodity terms of trade improve.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this paper we have constructed a model of trade in intermediate
goods that is very different from, and in some ways complementary to, the
usual approaches. We have avoided the circularity of input—output models
by stipulating a unidirectional sequence of production stages. At each
stage the good in process combines in naturally fixed proportions with a
labor—capital composite, thus removing the substitution between intermediate
and primary inputs which was a prominent feature of neoclassical models of
effective protection. In return, we are able to capture some complex
realities of manufacturing processes. We are able to determine production
specialization endogenously, and determine which intermediate goods will
be traded. Commercial policy works by shifting the stage at which a
country will import a good in process: a channel which corresponds to
factual observations in many industries. Well—known 'paradoxes' of effec-
tive protection have their counterparts in this setting; in addition there
are more subtle ways in which attempts at protection may fail under
empirically likely circumstances.
The model is readily adapted to deal with policies like establishment
of duty—free industrial zones. Conversion of the semi—small country model
into a full two—country model presents only algebraic difficulties, and
allows discussion of issues like direct foreign investment. These are
topics for future research.— 22—
FOOTNOTES
1. Empirical studies of the choiceof techniques in less developed
countries by Stewart (1972) and Pack (1976)
have found that although factor
substitution possibilities may be quitelimited for a given production pro-
cess, differences in factorintensities across processes can greatlymagnify
the total opportunity for substitution
between capital and labor in a given
sector. We find this potential magnificationto be a prominent featurein
the comparative statics of our model.
2. In particular, Falvey (1981) presentsa model where productionis
most similar in structure to ours.Falvey assumes, as we do,that production
in the continuum sector requires a
sector—specific factor, but differsfrom
us in assuming fixed proportions
between this factor and themobile factor.
He uses this model to study factor—endowment
motivated jra—industry trade,
and thus assumes that all output isfor final demand.
3. An alternative route would be to assumethat our ordering of stages
by labor intensities coineidesliterally with the sequencing of production,
and that a small amount of transport costsensures that factor prices are
generically different across countries.
4. This will be the case as long as
the endowments of all factors are
positive, and the productionfunctions in each sector satisfythe Inada con-
ditions.
5. The aggregate a is the logarithmicderivative of the ost—minimiZiflg
capital—labor ratio inte manufacturing sector as a wholewith respect to the
wage—rental ratio, for a given rangeof stages performed domestically.
It is
related to the elasticities ofsubstitution between capital andlabor at the
individual stages by a complicated expression
that is exactly analogous tothe
relationship between the elasticities
of substitution in the individualsectors
of a two—sector model and the aggregate
elasticity of substitution insupply,
as derived in Jones (1965, p.563).
6. See Nussa (1974).
7. We have —[yn + (1 — — x1=[c+ (1 + — (1+ )]
where and i,nC arerespectively the uncompensatedand compensated home
and foreign price elasticities,
and p the home marginal propensity
to consulPe
manufactures. Therefore, ifmanufactures are a normal good athome, nis
necessarily positive.
8. These net imports may be positive ornegative.
9.See footnote 1 above.
10.In principle there could be atariff schedule t(i) varyingwith the
index 1 .Thismay result in the goodsin process crossinginternational
boundaries several times, and mayalso break the pattern of completespecial-
ization by stages. Further,since our ordering of theindex i does not— 23—
necessarilycorrespond to the physical sequencing of stages, even with a
uniform tariff there may be several boundary crossings of intermediate goods.
In these cases the tariff is understood to be on a value—added basis to avoid
cascading, e.g. as in the application of offshore assembly provisions.
11.Grossman (1981) found a similar result in a partial equilibrium model
of content protection in which all adjustment occurs through an increase in
the ratio of domestically produced goods to imported intermediate goods of a
given kind.— 24—
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